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Extraterritoriality and American Depository Receipts: The Evolution of Section 1 O(b) from 
Morrison to Dodd-Frank 
Kelly Anderson* 
Part I. Introduction 
Extraterritoriality refers to the application of domestic laws outside of the jurisdiction. 1 
Conflicts can arise either between state laws and those of a foreign nation or between federal 
statutes and foreign laws; both of these are issues of choice or law or legislative jurisdiction? 
According to the presumption against extraterritoriality--one of the essential canons of 
construction-when Congress fails to specify whether its laws apply extraterritorially, courts are 
instructed to assume that they do not. 3 The presumption reflects the general view that Congress 
is primarily concerned with domestic conditions and with not offending international comity, an 
international principle that involves respect for other countries' laws.4 
Arguably one of the most important decisions in the last few decades concerrung 
application of the presumption is Morrison v. National Australia Bank.5 In this case, the 
Supreme Court determined that the presumption applied to the securities antifraud statute, 
Section 10(b) (hereinafter "Section 10(b)" or "10(b)").6 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
declares that it is "unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
*J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; MSc in Economic History, London School of 
Economics and Political Science; B.A. in Economics, University of Notre Dame. My sincere thanks to Professor 
Kristin N. Johnson for her thoughtful feedback, my Comments editor Chris Rojao for his tireless editing, the entire 
staff of the Seton Hall Law Review, and my family for their love and support. 
1 Lea Brilmayer Charles, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HA.Rv. L. REv. 1217, 
1224 (1992). 
2/d. 
3 John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 382 (2010). 
4 WilliamS. Dodge, Morrison's Effects Test, 40 Sw. L. REv. 687,687 (2011). 
5 Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
6 Id. at 2881. 
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contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe[.]"7 According to 
the Morrison court, since the statute did not give a clear indication of extraterritorial application, 
then Congress must not have intended it to apply extraterritorially.8 Further, since the statute 
specifically refers to purchases and sales of securities, its focus must be on the location of the 
transaction, rather than on the location of the fraud. 9 
The Morrison decision was important in two key respects. First, it transformed the 
presumption against extraterritoriality into a two-step inquiry. 10 Now, a plaintiff who wants to 
argue that a law should be applied extraterritorially might "try to show that Congress wanted its 
law to apply, or else argue that the case is sufficiently domestic, so that no congressional 
mandate need be shown to justify the statute's application."11 Second, it abrogated the conduct 
and effects test that had governed Second Circuit jurisprudence for roughly four decades.12 
According to the Morrison Court, whether significant conduct in perpetration of a fraud 
occurs on U.S. soil or whether the effects of the fraud are felt in the U.S. no longer determines 
whether Section I O(b) will apply to the purchases and sales of securities. 13 Rather, Section 1 O(b) 
will apply if the dispute involves: (1) "securities listed on domestic exchanges;" or (2) "domestic 
transactions in other securities."14 The Supreme Court criticized the Second Circuit for ignoring 
the traditional presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes and for crafting a test 
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § IO(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2012). 
8 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2873. 
9 !d. at 2874. 
10 Lea Bri1mayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 Sw. L. REV. 655, 663 (2011) 
II Jd. 
12 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972), invalidated by Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. 2869; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
2869. 
13 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869. 
14 !d. at 2884. 
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that had no textual support and produced inconsistent results. 15 But, even this seemingly 
straightforward approach left many open questions, such as the definition of a domestic 
transaction and to whom it applies. 16 
Shortly after the Supreme Court announced the Morrison decision, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank ActY In this Act, Congress essentially codified the conduct and effects test of the 
Second Circuit for actions brought by the SEC or the DOJ only. 18 In Section 929Y of the Act, 
Congress called for a survey of potential solutions to the extraterritoriality question in relation to 
private actions. 19 This survey serves as a springboard for the following discussion and for 
advocating a more "bright-line" approach to the treatment of American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs). This Comment argues that the best approach is to maintain the Morrison transactional 
test, but to redefine the second prong by clarifYing that domestic transactions include instances in 
which irrevocable liability is incurred in the United States. 
Part II of the Comment examines the history of Section I O(b) jurisprudence from the 
Second Circuit's conduct and effects tests to the transactional approach in Morrison and 
introduces the concept of irrevocable liability. Then, it will explain how the Dodd-Frank Act left 
open the question of whether Morrison is still good law and how the courts will treat private 
causes of action. Part III will offer some background on American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 
explain how they work, and distinguish between the different types of ADRs. Part IV will 
15 Id at 2873-74. 
16 See, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 672 F.3d 143, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[R]ather 
than looking to the identity of the parties, the type of security at issue, or whether each individual defendant engaged 
in conduct within the United States, we hold that a securities transaction is domestic when the parties incur 
irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction within the United States or when title is passed within the United 
States."); SEC v. Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("We do not agree that Morrison held that 
fraud on the domestic over-the-counter market does not fall within the prohibitions of§ 10(b) except where the 
trades qualify independently as 'domestic transactions."'). 
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010). 
18 ld at § 929P(b )(2). 
19 !d. at§ 929Y. 
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discuss different courts' analysis of complex financial instruments and these courts' 
interpretations of extraterritoriality in ADR cases. Part V discusses the findings of 929Y, and 
recommends an approach that leaves the Morrison approach largely intact, while safeguarding 
against the unfortunate circumstance mentioned in Justice Stevens' concurrence-the possibility 
of a fraud perpetrated on U.S. soil involving a foreign issuer and a foreign security.20 This 
Comment advocates for an approach that maintains the transactional test, while adopting the 
irrevocable liability definition for domestic transactions and thereby partially resurrecting the 
conduct test. This Comment also discuss how a bright-line rule will impact other types of 
complex financial instruments, such as contracts for difference (CFDs) and security-based 
swaps. Part VI concludes by summarizing the major points of the argument, calling on Congress 
to clarify the uncertain future of private causes of action for I O(b) violations, and suggesting that 
Congress institute the irrevocable liability standard for domestic transactions. 
Part II. History and Development of Section lO(b) 
A. Early Interpretations of Extraterritoriality: 
The Second Circuit's Conduct and Effects Test 
Since 1968, the Second Circuit, widely regarded as the go-to venue for securities 
litigation given that the premier stock exchanges in the United States are all within its 
jurisdiction, helped guide the interpretation of extraterritoriality claims under Section IO(b).21 
The Second Circuit first articulated the effects test in Schoenbaum v. First brook. 22 In 
Schoenbaum, an American shareholder of a Canadian oil company brought suit alleging that the 
company defrauded investors by selling significantly undervalued treasury shares to finance a 
20 Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
21 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972), invalidated by Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. 2869; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
2869. 
22 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200, invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
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new pipeline. 23 According to the court, Congress intended Section 1 O(b) to "protect domestic 
investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the 
domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American 
securities."24 In this case, since the alleged deceit could have reasonably impacted the value of 
Amex-listed equities, the plaintiffs successfully argued that Section 1 O(b) applied.25 
In 1972, the Second Circuit offered an alternative approach to Section 1 O(b ): the conduct 
test.26 In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, the U.S. plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant Maxwell deceived them into purchasing over-inflated shares of Pergarnom Press 
Limited, a British publishing company listed on the London Stock Exchange.27 Since Maxwell 
had made several trips to Leasco in New York to solicit the investment, the court concluded that 
significant conduct in perpetrating the fraud occurred on U.S. soil.28 Interpreting Congress's 
intent, the court concluded that "when, as here, there has been significant conduct within the 
territory, a statute cannot properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the 
clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go beyond the limits 
recognized by foreign relations law."29 Since Maxwell's conduct while in New York induced 
the plaintiffs to buy the shares (and subsequently lose money when the price fell), the court 
determined that Section 1 O(b) applied. 30 
Although the two cases seemed to establish a clear dictate on when Section 1 O(b) should 
apply, subsequent court interpretations surrounding the meaning of conduct seemed to blur the 
23 !d. at 205. 
24 !d. at 206 (emphasis added). 
25 !d. at 208-09. 
26 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
27 !d. at 1330. 
28 !d. at 1330-33. 
29 !d. at 1334. 
30 !d. 
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approach.31 For example, in Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that I O(b) would only apply when the referenced conduct in itself 
constituted a securities violation. 32 By contrast, other courts, such as the Third, Eighth, aud 
Ninth Circuits, found that "some conduct" in perpetration of the fraud was sufficient. 33 
Eventually, some courts even chose to adopt a hybrid approach, applying both tests to the 
same set of facts in order to determine "whether Congress would have wished the precious 
resources of United States courts aud law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather thau 
[to]leave the problem to foreign countries."34 For example, in SEC v. Berger, the court balauced 
the two approaches, ultimately determining that while it was likely that the alleged fraud would 
have satisfied the effects test, there was sufficient evidence to justify I O(b) jurisdiction based on 
the conduct test alone. 35 Given these varying interpretations of the Second Circuit's two 
approaches, the Supreme Court, on June 24, 2010, elected to use the Morrison case as a forum 
for resolving the varying interpretations of IO(b) extraterritoriality.36 
B. Morrison v. Nationa/Anstralia Bank 
During the relevaut period, National Australia Bank (the "Bank") was the largest bank in 
Australia.37 In 1998, the Bank bought Homeside Lending, Inc., a mortgage servicing compauy 
31 SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
32 Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31 ("The Second Circuit's rule seems to be that jurisdiction will lie in American courts where 
the domestic conduct comprises all the elements of a defendant's conduct necessary to establish a violation of 
section lO(b) and Rule 10b-5."). 
33 Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; Cont'l 
Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,415 (8th Cir. 1979) invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2869; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1977) invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869. 
34 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975). 
35 Berger, 322 F.3d at 192-93; see also Psirnenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983) 
("Since we fmd that there is jurisdiction under the [conduct test], we do not need to reach the question whether the 
effects test provides an independent basis for jurisdiction."). 
36 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (20 1 0). 
37 Id at 2875. 
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based in Florida?8 Although National Australia Bank touted Homeside's early success, the Bank 
eventually wrote down more than $2 billion in assets after it was discovered that the company 
used unrealistically low rates for risk of prepayment in its model, causing the assets to appear 
significantly more valuable than they actually were. 39 These actions prompted a precipitous 
decline in stock price and a loss of goodwil1.40 
The District Court dismissed the action based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).41 The Court of Appeals affirmed, arguing 
that the fraud arose from the actions of the corporate officers in Australia, rather than the 
accounting manipulation in Florida.42 Therefore, since the conduct at the center of the fraud 
occurred abroad, the court declined the exercise subject matter jurisdiction.43 
As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court first had to address the issue of jurisdiction.44 
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the determination of whether or not a court is permitted to 
rule on a particular issue, depending on various factors, such as the nature of the case and the 
relief sought.45 Prior to Morrison, the extraterritorial reach of Section IO(b) itself determined 
whether a court could hear a case.46 Instead, the majority argued that the extraterritorial 
application of Section 1 O(b) was a merits question, and therefore dismissal on the basis of subject 
matter jurisdiction was not appropriate.47 In the end, the Morrison case was dismissed anyway-
38 ld 
39 ld at 2875-76. A company will write down (reduce the value of) an asset when the value shown on the 
company's balance sheet (book value) exceeds its market value. 
40 ld at 2876. 
41 Id 
42 Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) affd. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
43 Id 
44 Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
45 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 2009). 
46 If Section I O(b) applied, the court could hear the case. If not, the case was automatically dismissed on the 
grounds of subject matter jurisdiction. 
47 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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a decision that still falls within the purview of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)-so 
there was no need for remand.48 
The Court then rejected the conduct and effects tests that had prevailed in the Second 
Circuit for decades, and opted instead for a transactional approach.49 In the court's view, the 
purpose of the Exchange Act was not merely to punish any deceptive conduct but to punish 
"deceptive conduct 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered. "'50 The Supreme Court explained 
that, according to the essential canons of statutory construction, there is a presumption against 
extraterritorial application when Congress does not expressly indicate otherwise.51 The Court 
did not find a sufficient "textual or even extratextual basis" for assuming that 1 O(b) should apply 
extraterritorially. 52 Based on the express language found in the Exchange Act, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Congress intended 1 O(b) to apply to: (1) "securities listed on domestic 
exchanges;" or (2) "domestic transactions in other securities."53 This test is known as the bright-
line or "transactional approach" to 1 O(b) application, and it supplanted the Second Circuit 
approach, which the Court found had suffered from unpredictable and inconsistent application. 54 
The Court's finding that extraterritoriality concerns precluded foreign plaintiffs holding 
the foreign securities of a foreign issues (so-called F-cubed litigation) from bringing a Section 
lO(b) fraud action in U.S. court was unanimous. 55 All eight justices agreed that the United States 
48 Id ("Since nothing in the analysis of the courts below tnrned on the mistake, a remand would only require a new 
Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(l) conclusion."). 
49 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. 
Ct. 2869; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
50 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
51 Id at 2879. 
52 Id at 2881; see also Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 
176 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
53 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
54 Id at 2878. 
55 Id. 
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was not the proper forum for this predominantly foreign dispute. 56 Even so, Justice Stevens 
Goined by Justice Ginsberg) concurred, arguing that since this case was so easily decided (given 
that essentially none of the parties had any ties to the United States), it was unnecessary to 
abrogate the decades-old Second Circuit approach. 57 As well, Justice Breyer wrote separately in 
order to reinforce that although Section 1 O(b) did not apply, fraudulent conduct may still fall 
within the purview of other state or federal antifraud statutes. 58 
C. How Dodd-Frank Complicated the Extraterritoriality Question 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Morrison, Congress responded by 
passing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("The Dodd-Frank 
Act" or "The Act"). 59 The Act appears to rebuke Morrison and reinstate the Second Circuit's 
conduct and effects tests but only as applied to public actions brought by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).60 Under both the Securities 
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, actions by the SEC or the DOJ are permissible 
as long as the claims involve: (1) "conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United 
States and involves only foreign investors"; or (2) "conduct occurring outside the United States 
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States."61 Although the language of 
the Act appears to be a strong indication of congressional intent, the language contains two key 
56 !d. "Justice Sotomayor took no part in consideration or decision." !d. at 2870. 
57 !d. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I would adhere to the general approach that has been the law in the Second 
Circuit, and most of the rest of the country, for nearly four decades."). 
58 !d. at 2884 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Thus, while state law or other federal fraud statutes ... may apply to the 
fraudulent activity alleged here to have occurred in the United States, I believe that § I O(b) does not. This case does 
not require us to consider other circumstances.") 




faults. 62 First, it does not expressly overrule Morrison, and second, it does not address 
extraterritoriality questions for private causes of action. 63 Therefore, the future of Section 1 O(b) 
in private actions remains uncertain. 64 
D. The Irrevocable Liability Approach 
The approach recommended in this comment seeks to preserve, but refine the Morrison 
approach, as it pertains to private causes of action. By adopting the Second Circuit's irrevocable 
liability approach to refine the definition of "domestic transactions," it casts a slightly wider net 
in order to capture some transactions in which a foreign issuer perpetrates a fraud on U.S. soil, 
while simultaneously seeking to minimize the risk to international comity. The concept of 
irrevocable liability dates back to the Second Circuit's 1954 decision of Blau v. Ogsbury. 65 In 
that case, the court had to determine whether the shareholder bound himself to a stock purchase, 
or in legal parlance "incurred an irrevocable liability" when he mailed his notice of election to 
purchase the shares or when he actually paid for the shares three years later. 66 The court held 
that the plaintiff incurred irrevocable liability when the letter was mailed-thus forming an 
"executory transaction,"-and therefore actual payment could not also constitute a "purchase. "67 
The courts later resurrected the concept of irrevocable liability in Plumbers' Union Local 
No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Company.68 Drawing from the language of Blau v. 




65 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954). 
66 Id at427. 
67 Id 
68 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 2d 
262,269 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) motion to certifY 
appeal denied, No. 10 CIV. 3229(BSJ), 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011). 
10 
irrevocable liability to take or pay for the stock. "'69 Although the plaintiffs argued that 
irrevocable liability arises when an investor places a purchase order for a security, the judges 
highlighted that other courts have already summarily rejected this definition.70 The court 
explained that the "Exchange Act requires that 'context' be considered in constructing terms 
such as 'purchase."'71 As such, an investor's residency, where they made the decision to invest, 
where they suffered the harm, where the order was placed, and where the trade was executed 
were all insufficient bases upon which to assert I O(b) application. 72 Although the court did not 
specifically lay out at which point irrevocable liability would be incurred in this case, it stated 
conclusively that the facts of the case did not meet this test. 
Approximately nine months later, the Southern District ofNew York again addressed the 
issue of irrevocable liability.73 There, the court explained that a purchaser incurs irrevocable 
liability to "take or pay" for a stock at the same time that the seller incurs irrevocable liability to 
d I. h . 74 e 1ver t e secunty. Simply distributing marketing materials and exchanging emails that 
encouraged an investor to purchase a stock by itself does not create irrevocable liability, 
69 /d. at 177; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Mauor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) ("[T]he holders of puts, calls, 
options, and other contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized as 'purchasers' or 
'sellers' of securities for purposes of Rule I Ob--5, not because of a judicial conclusion that they were similarly 
situated to 'purchasers' or 'sellers,' but because the defmitional provisions of the 1934 Act themselves graut them 
such a status.") (emphasis added). 
70 Plumbers' Union Local No. 12, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 177; see In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 
2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); see also Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. 
Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV I0-0922(DSF)(AJWX), 2010 WL 
3377409, at *I (C.D. Cal. Jnly 16, 2010). 
71 Plumbers' Union Local No. 12, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
72 !d. at 178. 
73 SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) motion to certify appeal denied, No. 10 CJV. 
3229(BSJ), 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011). 
74 !d. at 157-158. 
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according to the court. 75 Therefore, the SEC failed to establish that the transaction occurred in 
the United States. 
Similarly, m Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., the court likened 
irrevocable liability to "entering into a binding contract."76 In 2001, Liberty Media agreed with 
Vivendi executives to exchange its shares of multiThematiques for Vivendi American 
Depository Shares (ADSs).77 Thereafter, defendants were accused of de-frauding plaintiffs 
when, instead of delivering ADSs, they were given ordinary shares when the merger closed.78 
The plaintiffs complained that this transaction constituted a breach of the original merger 
agreement, which expressly called for delivery of ADSs. 79 The court concluded that the merger 
agreement was a binding contract and therefore the defendant incurred irrevocable liability at the 
point the merger agreement was executed.80 Moreover, even if conditions remained or the 
agreement was amended thereafter, the parties were still bound by the initial agreement. 81 
These cases demonstrate that partial or revocable liability will not suffice. 82 The plaintiff 
must definitively establish that the seller incurred irrevocable liability. Simply marketing a 
security or executing a trade is insufficient. But, for example, execution of a merger agreement 
or a transfer of title will yield irrevocable liability. Therefore, if Congress did opt to define 
"domestic transaction" in terms of irrevocable liability, it may be worthwhile to create a 
representative list of instances that satisfY the definition of incurring irrevocable liability in order 
75 !d. at 157; see also Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp. Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that a fraudulent statement made to New York-based managing director that induced him 
to purchase the stock was insufficient to claim irrevocable liability). 
76 Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 2d 262,269 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 




81 /d. at 269. 
82 See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. 08 CIV. 7508(SAS), 2012 WL 3584278, 
n.l96 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012). 
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to maintain Morrison's bright line and avoid inadvertently reinstating a full verswn of the 
conduct test. 
Part III. What Are ADRs and How Do They Work? 
The issue of whether or not Section 1 O(b) applies is even more complicated when the 
security itself has both foreign and domestic facets. American Depository Receipts ("ADRs"), 
for example, present a unique challenge to the Morrison approach. An ADR is essentially a 
certificate that represents a U.S. investor's ownership of a foreign stock.83 Although the ADR is 
the actual physical certificate signifying an investor's ownership interest in a foreign security, 
and an American Depository Share ("ADS") is the security itself, these terms are often used 
interchangeably, and this Comment will treat them as such.84 Each ADR may represent one 
share, many shares, or fractional shares of a foreign stock, and the price of each ADR depends on 
the listed price of the underlying security in the issuer's home market. 85 The allure of the 
ADR-versus actually listing ordinary common shares on an exchange-is that ADRs offer a 
cost-effective way to raise new capital or reach new investors without necessarily having to incur 
the expense of the expensive reporting requirements of the SEC. 86 
Among other things, the creation of ADRs allowed investors access to foreign markets-
thereby permitting international diversification of their portfolios-and generate new ways to 
raise capital. 87 To create an ADR, foreign securities are deposited with a custodian, usually a 
domestic bank or trust company, which holds the securities for its counterpart bank or trust 
83 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at AI (An ADR is "a negotiable security that represents 
an ownership interest in a specified number of foreign securities that have been placed with a depository financial 
institution by holders of such securities"). 
84 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at AI, n.l. 
85 International Investing, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ininvest.htm (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2012). 
86 HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 122-24 
(19th ed. 2012). 
87 Mark Saunders, American Depository Receipts: An Introduction to US. Capital Markets for Foreign Markets, 17 
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 48, 48-'19 (1993). 
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company in the United States.88 The trust company will, in turn, issue negotiable receipts to 
distribute to U.S. investors.89 These receipts are listed in U.S. dollars, and the custodian, where 
applicable, is responsible for issuing dividends and reporting on major corporate events in 
English.90 
There are two primary classes of ADRs: sponsored and unsponsored.91 For a sponsored 
facility, the ADR is "created jointly by the issuer and the depository through the execution of a 
deposit agreement and a registration statement on Form F-6."92 By contrast, an unsponsored 
ADR is created independently of the issuer, although sometimes the depository will solicit letters 
of non-objection.93 The shares are usually not listed on any national exchange and, since the 
relationship between custodian and the company is informal, the company may not be required 
to make any filings with the SEC.94 Domestic exchanges, such as the NYSE and the American 
Stock Exchange (Amex), generally refuse to list ADRs, so investors will typically trade such 
instruments over-the-counter and on the Pink Sheets.95 
ADRs are divided into three official levels: Level I, II, and III. Level I ADRs are traded 
over-the-counter, do not raise new capital, and are subject to only minimal registration and 
reporting requirements-a company usually only has to sign a registration statement.96 
Similarly, Level II ADRs do not raise new capital, but since they are listed on a domestic 
88 SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 86, at 122. 
89 Id 
90 Id 
91 Saunders, supra note 87, at 54-57. 
92 SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 86, at 123. 
93 Jd 
94 Jd ("While issuer participation is not necessary in establishing an unsponsored facility, its cooperation may be 
necessary. If the issuer is not exempt from reporting under the 1934 Act, the issuer must apply for the 12g3-2(b) 
exemption."). 
95 !d. Over-the-counter stocks refer to those "[n]ot listed or traded on an organized securities exchange." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (9th ed. 2009). A pink sheet is a "daily publication listing over-the-counter stocks, their 
market-makers, and their prices." Id at 1265. 
96SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 86, at 124. 
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exchange, they are subject to heightened reporting requirements.97 Level III ADRs are most 
closely analogous to stocks in that they raise new capital, are listed on the major exchanges-
such as the NYSE, NASDAQ and Amex-and must be reported to the SEC.98 
Alternatively, some issuers may opt to distribute their securities through a 144A offering, 
in which the securities are distributed only to qualified institutional investors.99 In a 144A 
offering, an issuer offers a limited number of restricted shares to qualified institutional buyers100 
only in order to avoid the registration requirements of the SEC.101 Since the shares are not 
registered, it allows an issuer to raise new capital, while avoiding the expensive reporting 
requirements of the SEC.102 These shares raise new capital for the issuer, but are not listed and 
are generally exempt from nearly all registration and reporting requirements. 103 The drawback of 
these offerings is that even the buyers are prohibited from re-selling the securities without first 
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99 Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (2011); LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 391-92 (4th ed. 2001). 
100 Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities 
Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,934 (Apr. 23, 1990) ( defming a 
Tier One qualified institutional buyer as one with more than $100 million in assets). 
101 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144a Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409,422 (2008). 
102 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at434-37. 
103 SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 86, at 124. 
104 ld. 
105 ld. at 122-24. 
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Level III Listed on a domestic Raise new capital for Mandatory reporting 
exchange, such as NYSE or the issuer requirements 
NASDAQ 
144A Not listed on any domestic Raise new capital for Typically, exempt from 
Offering exchange the issuer reporting requirements 
Depending on the type, ADRs may fall under either prong of the Morrison test. Courts 
tend to disagree on whether ADRs qualify as listed on a domestic exchange, a domestic 
transaction, or neither. 106 Some courts have characterized ADRs as a "predominantly foreign 
securities transaction," suggesting that Section I O(b) should not apply. 107 But, according to the 
SEC, "[w]hen you buy and sell ADRs you are trading in the U.S. market. Your trade will clear 
and settle in U.S. dollars."108 The SEC definition suggests that ADRs function like U.S. 
securities and therefore one would assume Section I O(b) should apply. As of the publication of 
this Comment, it seems as though the majority of courts are willing to extend application of 
Section lO(b) to ADRs. 109 
Part IV. How ADRs Have Fared Since Morrison 
Prior to the Morrison decision, courts generally found that holders of ADRs could assert 
antifraud claims under Section I O(b ). In In re SCOR Holding, the plaintiffs asserted antifraud 
claims against a multinational reinsurer headquartered in Switzerland, claiming that the company 
misrepresented the sufficiency of their loss reserves in North AmericaY 0 Applying the Second 
Circuit's conduct and effects test, the court found that, while the holders of foreign securities 
106 Morrison v. Nat' I Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2869 (2010). 
107 In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495 (RMB), 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); 
Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re SCOR Holding (Switzerlaod) AG Litig., 537 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
108 International Investing, supra note 85. 
109 See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Royal Bank of 
Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 
2d 620, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV I0-0922(DSF)(AJWX), 2010 WL 3377409 
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010). 
110 In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
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were not permitted to assert a claim, the claim by ADS holders was permissible. 111 In particular, 
the court considered that seven to eleven percent of the company's shares traded in the form of 
ADSs on the NYSE; therefore, the court held that the fraud had a substantial effect on the United 
S d . . . 112 tates an Its citizens. 
Even under the new Morrison approach, courts have generally favored application of 
IO(b) to claims by ADR holders. In 2010, the district court for the Central District of California 
ruled that ADR holders could maintain an antifraud suit against Toyota. 113 The court held that 
"domestic transactions" under Section I O(b) included "purchases and sales of securities 
explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States rather than transactions in foreign-
traded securities where the ultimate purchaser or seller has physically remained in the United 
States."114 
Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the mere 
involvement of "some domestic activity" would not be sufficient to overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.115 Here, the plaintiffs tried to argue that Morrison was a narrow 
holding that only applied to so-called F-cubed casesY6 The court disagreed, however, and 
asserted that the plaintiffs' attempts to bring holders of CSG-listed on SWX, the Swiss stock 
exchange-within the ambit of Section lO(b) on the grounds that some activity in the trade's 
execution occurred in the U.S. was akin to attempting to resurrect the conduct approach, which 
had been clearly repudiated in Morrison. 117 Therefore, although the holders of ADSs were 
111 Id at 560. 
112 Id at 561. 
113 Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *I. 
114 Id 
115 Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
116 Id at 625. 
mId at 627. 
17 
permitted to state a claim under 1 O(b ), the claims brought by the foreign security holders were 
dismissed. 118 
Later, the Southern District of New York clarified that mere possession of ADRs was 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction for foreign plaintiffs. 119 In In re Vivendi Universal, the 
plaintiffs alleged that Vivendi executives misled investors about the financial health and outlook 
of the business; once the company unveiled the true condition of the business, the shares 
plummetedY0 The plaintiffs argued that since the shares were cross-listed (ordinary shares 
listed in France and Level III ADRs listed on the NYSE in the United States), any existing 
shareholder could assert a cause of action under 1 O(b ). 121 The court found this argument 
unpersuasive, holding that the plaintiffs contention was contrary to the "spirit" of Morrison. 122 
Recently, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs could bring an 
action against a foreign fund that traded U.S.-listed stocks through a U.S. broker dealer. 123 The 
court determined that the appropriate test for whether the defendant's actions constituted a 
"domestic" transaction turned on whether the issuer incurred irrevocable liability or "title 
passe[ d] within the United States."124 Here, the defendants traded penny stocks through PIPE 
(public investment private equity) transactions. 125 Although the plaintiffs attempted to argue that 
the location of the broker dealer or the origin of the securities (U.S.-listed penny stocks) should 
determine whether 1 O(b) should apply, the court concluded that these arguments conflicted with 
118 Id at 629. 
119 In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
120 Id at 524. 
121 Id at 531. 
122 Id at 530. 
123 Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012). 
124 Id at 66-<;7. 
125 Practiciog Law Institute defines PIPEs as "private placements of publicly traded equity securities that are 
contractually structured to provide future liquidity through an effective resale registration statement." PIPEs: A 
Review of Key Legal Issues, Practiciog Law Inst., 1761 Prac. L. Inst. 371, 373 (2009). 
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the logic of Morrison. 126 Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient 
evidence to show that the transactions occurred in the United States.127 
Even private placements of ADRs to qualified institutional buyers may constitute 
"domestic transactions" for the purposes of Section 1 O(b ). In Wu v. Stomber, the plaintiffs 
alleged that they were defrauded into buying shares of a company, whose sole business was 
buying residential mortgage-based securities on margin, without adequate explanation of the 
risks associated with this type of investment. 128 The court found that holders of Restricted 
Depository Shares (RDSs)129 could maintain a cause of action under lO(b) because, even though 
not listed on any exchange, the RDSs were "bought or sold in the United States."130 
These cases provide several important lessons about how the courts may be willing to 
treat ADRs in the aftermath of Morrison. First, the courts may analyze whether 
extraterritoriality precludes a finding of liability for ADR holders under either the first or second 
prong of the Morrison test. Level II and Level III ADRs will most likely satisfY the first prong 
("securities listed on domestic exchanges"), since they are typically listed on the NYSE, Amex, 
or NASDAQ.131 In most instances, courts are also willing to apply Section lO(b) to Level I 
ADRs or those issued through 144A offerings under the second prong ("domestic transactions in 
other securities."). 132 
126 !d. at 68-{)9. 
127 Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 70. 
128 Wu v. Stomber, No. 11-2287,2012 WL 3276975, at *I (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2012). 
129 RDSs are similar to ADRs, but they are sold only to qualified institutional buyers and accredited investors. 
130 Stomber, 2012 WL 3276975, at *15. 
131 See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re SCOR Holding 
(Switzerland) AG Litigation, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
132 Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,2884 (2010); see Stomber, 2012 WL 3276975 (2012). 
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Second, trades of foreign securities that are merely executed, cleared, or settled in the 
United States do not constitute "domestic transactions" for the purposes of 1 O(b ).133 As applied 
to ADRs, this means that the trade itself will not create liability under lO(b); rather, the court will 
look for something more, such as listing ADRs on an exchange, filing with the SEC, or 
generating capital from U.S. markets.134 Similarly, merely cross-listing some shares in the 
United States does not create a cause of action for individuals who purchased their securities 
abroad. 135 If IO(b) applied to cross-listed shares, then holders of foreign securities could 
theoretically piggy-back on the claims of exchange-listed ADR holders, leading to excessively 
unpredictable results and potentially creating serious conflicts with international laws. 136 Third, 
residency in the United States or citizenship does not automatically trigger 1 O(b) application.137 
Finally, as explained in Morrison, the key concern is where the transaction occurred, and not the 
deception itself. 138 
And yet, even with the wealth of cases in support of treating ADRs under Section lO(b), 
several courts might still disagree. For example, to date, no court has expressly overruled the 
holding in In re Societe Generale Securities Litigation. 139 In this case, plaintiffs brought suit 
against Societe Generale, a French company whose ordinary shares were listed on the Euronext 
Paris stock exchange, for failing to establish sufficient internal risk controls, for misleading 
investors about the extent of their subprime mortgage exposure, and generally for making 
133 See also Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620,620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor 
Co., No. CV 10-0922 (DSF)(AJWX), 2010 WL 3377409, at *I (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010). 
134 In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327,337-338 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
135 In re Alstrom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d469, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see Cormvell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
136 See, e.g., In re IJBS Sec. Litig., 07 CIV. 11225 (RJS), 2011 WL 4059356 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); In re 
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In reA/strom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 
472 ("Though isolated clauses of the opinion may be read as requiring only that a security be "listed" on a domestic 
exchange for its purchase anywhere in the world to be cognizable under the federal securities laws, those excerpts 
read in total context compel the opposite result."). 
137 See Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
138 Morrison v. Nat'] Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,2874 (2010) ("The Exchange Act's focus is not on the 
place where the deception originated, but on purchases and sales of securities in the United States."). 
139 In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495 (RMS), 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010). 
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materially false financial statements to shareholders. 140 The court highlighted that the ADRs 
were not traded on an official exchange-such as New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ-but 
were rather traded over the counter, and therefore, I O(b) would not apply to what the court 
considered a "predominantly foreign securities transaction."141 As such, the court granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss.142 
In the absence of an express Supreme Court ruling on ADRs or a clearer Congressional 
mandate, the controversy over when to apply Section I O(b) is likely to continue. Given ADRs' 
ties to the underlying foreign security, there are arguments to be made against the application of 
IO(b). But, in order to further the interests of the Exchange Act in protecting U.S. investors, this 
Comment advocates for a test that brings ADRs definitively under the ambit of I O(b ). 
Part V. Alternative Solutions and the Irrevocable Liability Standard 
A. The Results of the Cross-Border Study 
In order to try to answer the extraterritoriality question, the Commission authorized a 
study through Section 929Y in order to solicit comments and suggestions on this issue.143 In 
response, the Commission received seventy-two comment letters, more than forty of which 
supported the conduct and effects test (or some modified version thereof), more than twenty of 
which supported the Morrison approach, and only a handful of which advocated a different 
approach or simply provided additional information to the Commission. 144 Letters submitted by 
investors homogeneously supported the conduct and effects tests, whereas those submitted by 
140 Id at *I. 
141 ld (quoting In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
142 !d. at *2. 
143 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
144 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at v, 39. 
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foreign governments generally advocated limiting private causes of action. 145 Moreover, issuers 
and their associated organizations consistently supported Morrison's transactional approach.146 
The primary arguments for retention of the transactional approach included concerns 
about excessive litigation, international comity, and policy choices. 147 Additionally, supporters 
argued that a bright-line approach would lead to enhanced market growth by increasing 
predictability and preventing "wasteful and abusive litigation" in order to "ease the burden of the 
already overtaxed courts."148 According to the study: 
[i]nternational comity is a customary international-law principle involving 
respect for the validity and effect of nations' executive, legislative and 
judicial determinations . . . . U.S. courts and government agencies often 
attempt, where possible, to balance the public and private interests of the 
United States with the competing policies of foreign jurisdictions when a 
conflict arises between U.S. and foreign law. 149 
Critics, on the other hand, argued that even the bright-line approach is still not so bright 
given the difficulty in determining where the transaction itself took place or whether investors 
would even be aware of the location of the transaction. 150 Moreover, they argued that the 
transactional approach restricts portfolio diversification by scaring away foreign issuers, forces 
institutional investors into the more illiquid ADR markets, requires investors to resort to foreign 
litigation, and fails to protect investors who were duped by foreign companies. 151 
Those in favor of retaining the conduct and effects test argued that it promoted investor 
protection and reflected the "economic reality" that even foreign issuers may have extensive 
145 !d. at 39. 
146 Id at 39-40. 
147 !d. at v. 
148 Id at v, 21. 
149 Id at 9 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, !59 U.S. 113, 143 (1895)); Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International 
Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 19 (2008)). 
150 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 42-43 (citing a letter submitted from sixty-nine 
pension funds, which warned that the Morrison approach may deprive private investors of a I O(b) right of action 
when they may have had no knowledge of or no choice in where their transaction took place). 
151 ld at 9. 
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operations in the United States.152 In addition, proponents argued that the conduct and effects 
test ensured that cunning, fraudulent issuers could not skirt lO(b) liability merely by listing 
abroad and defrauding investors within the United States and that the test actually facilitated 
comity by protecting U.S. and foreign ideals. 153 On the other hand, the conduct and effects 
opponents argued that the DOJ and SEC were more than capable of protecting investors without 
the need for such a complicated approach and foreign markets could offer protection to U.S. 
investors in antifraud matters that occurred on foreign soil. 154 The critics also pointed out that 
the conduct and effects test "bears little relation to investors' expectations about whether they are 
protected by U.S. securities laws."155 Further, they warned that the conduct and effects test can 
lead to unpredictable results, potentially spurring a "chilling effect on foreign direct investment 
in the United States as well as capital formation in U.S. markets."156 
Institutional investors, in particular, cited a number of concerns with respect to ADRs. 
First, they noted that it is unclear whether ADRs are considered a "domestic transaction" under 
the transactional test. 157 Yet, even if Morrison does protect purchasers of ADRs, the relatively 
small size of the ADR markets relative to equities may severely constrain a portfolio manager's 
ability to diversify its holdings internationally, since the transactional test does not protect 
investors of foreign securities.158 Moreover, limiting investors' holdings only to ADRs inhibits 
their ability to trade quickly on market information, since investors would have to wait until U.S. 
152 !d. at v-vi. 
153 !d. 
154 !d. at 54-55. Several letters in support of this view were submitted from the governments of Australia, France, 
Germany and Switzerland, among others. /d. at 55 n.202. 
155 !d. at vi. 
156 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 53-54. 
157/d. at 45. Compare Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV I 0-0922(DSF)(AJWX), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) with In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286 
(S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 2010). 
158 /d. at 45. 
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markets open. 159 Trading in ADRs is also much more expensive than equities trading, if one 
factors in the depository fees. 160 On the whole, institutional investors agreed that the conduct 
and effects test better protects U.S. investors from fraud. 
B. Potential Solutions From The 929Y Study 
One potential solution proffered from the comment letters was that Congress should 
reinstate the conduct and effects test but limit its availability to U.S. citizens or U.S.-based 
institutions.161 Arguably, this solution most directly addresses one of the key aims of the 
Securities Exchange Act: namely, protecting U.S. investors.162 Additionally, this approach 
would likely not offend international comity, since foreign nations would be hard-pressed to 
argue against the U.S. protecting its own citizens. But, this approach would effectively overrule, 
at least in part, one post-Morrison decision in which the court stated that residency/citizenship is 
an insufficient basis for application of I O(b ). 163 Further, potential criticisms of this approach 
may be that it does not resolve the "predictability" problem of the conduct and effects test that 
Morrison tried to remedy, that it is unfair to distinguish between U.S. and foreign investors, and 
that it could create a chilling effect on foreign investment in the U.S.-although this fear has yet 
to be substantiated. 
Alternatively, some of those surveyed, including the American Bar Association and 
prominent law professors, advocated a "fraud-in-the-inducement test," which dictates that I O(b) 
should apply in situations where the issuer reached into the United States. 164 This test would 
"focus on the location of the investor at the time the investor is induced to purchase or sell 
159 /d 
160 Id at 45-46. 
161 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 55. 
162 /d 
163 Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
164 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 57. 
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securities in reliance on a materially false or misleading statement or pursuant to a manipulative 
act."165 Arguably, by focusing on how the fraudsters targeted U.S. investors, this approach would 
alleviate international comity concerns while still protecting against the very scenario that Justice 
Stevens warned of in Morrison. Like conduct and effects, however, it too could suffer from 
unpredictable and inconsistent results. 166 
Instead, other commenters suggested a variation of the Leasco conduct test, under which 
IO(b) would only apply if the plaintiff's injury was a direct result of conduct in the United 
States.167 According to the study, when securities fraud actually occurs in the United States, 
"there seems little doubt that the resulting injuries that occur to investors outside the United 
States would be a direct result of the U.S. conduct."168 This approach would likely produce the 
benefits described by the Solicitor General in Morrison, including easing international comity 
concerns and filtering frivolous claims--especially those that have only a loose connection to the 
United States.169 Yet, it could still lead to expensive and time-consuming litigation, which 
would tax the U.S. court system and potentially deter foreign investors. 170 Unfortunately, if the 
injury resulted from solicitation of a foreign purchase, IO(b) would apply, even if the foreign 
nation is perhaps a better venue to resolve the controversy. 
A fourth approach authorized application of 1 O(b) in cases where securities listed on a 
foreign exchange were of the same type of shares as those listed in the United States. 171 The 
ingenuity of this approach is that it creates predictability-foreign issuers should reasonably 
165 Id 
166 Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the 
injustice of an F -cubed plaintiff who was defrauded at his home by representatives of a foreign issuer). 
16 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972), invalidated by Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. 2869; SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 61. 
168 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 61. 
169 Br. for U.S. as amicus curiae supporting respondents at 27-28, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869,2894-95 (2010) (No. 
08-1191). 
170 See SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at vi. 
171 Id at 64. 
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expect to be subject to litigation in a nation where it has listed shares-and it solves the dilemma 
of "best execution" policy. 172 Here, institutional investors would also be more apt to trade in 
foreign markets because they would have a cause of action available in the United States. That 
said, the "same class" method does open the door for F -cubed cases, presenting a threat to 
comity, undermining the result in Morrison, and potentially deterring foreign issuers from cross-
listing their shares on a U.S. exchange. 
Finally, one additional solution contained in 929Y is that Congress could mandate that 
whenever a transaction takes place in the United States, regardless of whether the underlying 
security is listed in the United States, 1 O(b) should apply.173 This solution would essentially 
codifY the irrevocable liability test advocated in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Limited v. 
Ficeto. 174 The focus is not on trade execution per se, which would undermine the holding in 
Cornwell, but more so on whether the investor makes or accepts an offer to purchase a security 
on U.S. soil. This approach would afford the greatest protection to U.S. citizens, it would not 
present international comity concerns, and would generally be consistent with principles of 
contract law. But concerns over predictability and its potential chilling effect on foreign 
. ld "II . 175 mvestment wou stt remam. 
C. How Irrevocable Liability Can Save Morrison and Appease Congress 
Although, in theory, the Morrison approach presents a compelling, straightforward 
approach for when courts should apply Section 1 O(b ), in practice the test is not perfectly 
predictable, especially in cases involving complex financial instruments, like ADRs. Although 
172 Several commentators complained that because some brokers have a rule of"best execution," investors are not 
always informed from which exchange (international or domestic) their purchases derive. SEC Study, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 43. Therefore, if a fraud occurs and "best execution" forced a broker to purchase 
their shares on a foreign exchange, they have no recourse under Morrison. !d. 
173 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 68. 
174 Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 672 F.3d 143, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2012). 
175 SEC Study, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 68-69. 
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the majority of courts have found that sponsored ADRs should fall under 1 O(b ), at least one other 
court has held that ADRs represent a "predominantly foreign securities transaction."176 It is 
possible that In re Societe Generale will be expressly overruled. But, in the interim, Congress 
will need to craft its own solution for private causes of action under 1 O(b ). 
Adoption of the irrevocable liability definition under the second prong of Morrison 
would alleviate tension in the courts by creating a bright-line rule for application of 1 O(b) to 
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of ADRs. To illustrate, it is useful to consider a 
few hypothetical examples demonstrating the precise application of irrevocable liability. 
Scholars and courts agree that plaintiffs in an F-cubed action (foreign issuer, foreign 
plaintiff, and foreign transaction) should not be entitled access to U.S. courts. 177 For a variety of 
reasons-most notable of which is that the U.S. class action litigation is perceived as the most 
efficient vehicle for litigating securities fraud cases-many foreign plaintiffs try to litigation in 
the United States. 178 But with little to nothing to tie them to the United States or its securities 
markets, courts have flatly refused to hear such cases likely due to concerns over international 
comity, judicial resources, and jurisdiction.179 
The answer to the extraterritorial question is even more complicated in F -squared cases, 
where the issuer, plaintiff, or security is based in the United States, but the other two (issuer, 
176 In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMS), 2010 WL 3910286, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010). 
177 See Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,2894 n.ll (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (although 
Justice Stevens supported maintaining the Second Circuit's approach, the Justice noted that virtually all F-cubed 
actions "should" and "would" be rejected given their tenuous connection to the United States); Cornwell v. Credit 
Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Section IO(b) "clearly" does not apply to F-cubed actions). 
178 Peter M. Saparoff & Katharine C. Beattie, The Benefits of Including Foreign Investors in U.S. Securities Class 
Action Suits, SN084 A.L.L-A.B.A. 669 (2008); Elaine Buckberg & Max Gulker, Cross-Border Shareholder Class 
Actions Before and After Morrison (NERA working paper) (2010). 
179 See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2874; Quail Cmises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur 
Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2010) vacated and remanded, 645 F.3d 1307 (lith Cir. 2011) 
(merely sending documents to and intending to close a transaction in Miami did not render the transaction 
domestic); In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317-18 (S.D. Fla. 2010) affd sub 
nom. lnversiones Mar Octava Lirnitada v. Banco Santander S.A., 439 F. App'x 840 (lith Cir. 2011) (even though 
the funds invested in U.S. securities, because they were registered in the Bahamas, the plaintiffs had asserted an F-
cubed claim that falls outside the protection of I O(b )). 
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plaintiff, or security) are foreign. 18° Consider the following two F-squared hypotheticals from 
the Stevens concurrence in Morrison. 181 Both deal with fraud perpetrated by a foreign issuer 
with a foreign security on a U.S. investor. 182 In both instances, the Morrison test precluded 
application of extraterritoriality to the hypothetical 1 O(b) claim. 183 
Imagine, for example, an American investor who buys shares in a 
company listed only on an overseas exchange. That company has a major 
American subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was 
in New York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a 
massive deception which artificially inflated the stock price-and which 
will, upon its disclosure, cause the price to plurnmet.184 
Under the classic conduct and effects test, the court would absolutely be entitled to hear 
the 1 O(b) claim. Since the foreign executives were based in New York and devised and executed 
the fraudulent scheme in New York, sufficient conduct in perpetration of the fraud occurred on 
U.S. soil.185 Conversely, under the new Morrison test, the investor would have to resort to 
foreign courts to hear the claim. Extraterritoriality applies under Morrison when the transaction 
involves either a U.S. security or a U.S. transaction in some "other" security. 186 Here, clearly the 
first prong of Morrison will not apply, because it is indisputably a foreign security. In addition, 
180 See, e.g., In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 799 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss IO(b) 
action brought by U.S.-based holders ofBP common stock traded on the LSE on the grounds that citizenship was an 
insufficient ground to extend I O(b) liability over a foreign issuer); In re Infmeon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., C 04-04156 
JW, 2011 WL 7121006, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 20ll)(althougb Infmeon shares were cross-listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, the court concluded that holders of common stock listed on the Frankfort Stock Exchange 
could not assert a case of action under IO(b)); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp.,_729 F.Supp.2d 620, 623-24 
(S.D.N.Y.2010) (the mere fact that the foreign issuer also had ADRs listed in the U.S. was insufficient ground to 
bring an action based on trading in common stock). 




185 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972), invalidated by Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. 2869 ("[W]hen, as here, there has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot properly 
be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have 
meant to go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law.") (emphasis added). 
186 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
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the second prong will also not apply because no transaction has occurred in the U.S., foreign 
security or otherwise. 
Now, consider how this investor would fare if the second prong of Morrison was 
redefined to include instances in which the issuer incurred irrevocable liability in the United 
States. At this point in the hypothetical, the investor will still have no recourse, because the 
scheme has been developed but not yet implemented. 187 The investor has not yet suffered an 
injury, and there are no facts to suggest that the investor incurred irrevocable liability. 
Therefore, this approach would yield the same result as Morrison, and the courts would not run 
afoul of international comity concerns. 
On the other hand, consider Justice Stevens' second hypothetical. 
[I]magine that those same executives go knocking on doors in Manhattan 
and convince an unsophisticated retiree, on the basis of material 
misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the company's doomed 
securities. 188 
Here, the result from the conduct and effects test is unchanged. Clearly, the fraudulent 
conduct from the first hypothetical continues to the second. In addition, since the primary effect 
of the scheme was to defraud U.S. investors, the case for application of extraterritoriality is even 
stronger. As the Second Circuit has articulated, the Exchange Act was designed to "protect 
domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect 
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American 
187 This is true under any of the above-referenced approaches. A IO(b) cause of action requires proof of six 
elements: {I) material misrepresentation or omission; (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (3) 
scienter; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss, and (6) causation. Private Securities Litigation, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) 
(West 2010); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-232, 248-249 (1988); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,730-731 (1975). In the frrst 
hypothetical, a purchase or sale has not yet occurred. If one assumes for the purpose of the hypothetical that the 
investor did purchase the security after the scheme was hatched and was the unfortunate victim of the subsequent 
decrease in share price, the investor would still have no recourse under 10(b) because the issuer did nothing to incur 
irrevocable liability on U.S. soil. 
188 /d. 
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securities."189 Similarly, the result under Morrison does not change. Even though the investor 
likely made the decision to purchase the stock in United States and called her broker in the 
United States to place the trade, and even though the trade most likely cleared in the United 
States, the post-Morrison courts have already determined that these are insufficient bases to 
render the transaction "domestic."190 Ultimately, since the trade was executed on the floor of the 
foreign exchange, it is definitively a foreign transaction and thus, the investor will have no 
recourse in the American courts. 
One might argue that this result produces a grave injustice. As Justice Stevens 
articulated, the new test narrowed "[IO(b)'s] reach to a degree that would surprise and alarm 
generations of American investors ... [and] the Congress that passed the Exchange Act."191 Yet 
if the Morrison approach was modified slightly to include the irrevocable liability standard, the 
investor would most likely be protected. Here, the plaintiffs case would focus on the fact that 
representatives of the issuer came to her home and convinced her to invest her entire life savings 
in the security. The parties thus entered into an "executory transaction," and her later payment 
for the shares that she already promised to buy is irrelevant. 192 This hypothetical goes far 
beyond simply distributing marketing materials or exchanging emails, 193 but rather represents a 
willingness of the parties to enter into a binding, implied-in-fact contract.194 Therefore, the 
representatives of the issuer could be said to incur irrevocable liability in the United States. This 
189 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), invalidated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 
(emphasis added). 
190 See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620,620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., 
No. CV 10-0922 (DSF) (AJWX), 2010 WL 3377409, at *I (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010). 
191 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (2010). In Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, 861 F.Supp.2d 262, 269 
(S.D.N. Y. 20 12), the court distinguished a merger agreement that would solidifY irrevocable liability from a 
"preliminary agreement." According to the court, the merger agreement constituted a binding obligation to purchase 
the company; therefore, it did not matter if conditions remained. /d 
192 Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426,426 (2d Cir. 1954). 
193 SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) motion to certifY appeal denied, No. 10 
CIV. 3229 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011). 
194 Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, 861 F.Supp.2d 262, 269 (2012). 
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conclusion avoids the unjust result Justice Stevens predicted and since the United States clearly 
has an interest in protecting its citizens-particularly when the fraud occurs within its borders-
it should not offend international comity. 
Under this new articulation of the Morrison approach "some conduct"-as in the first 
hypothetical-will not suffice, but I O(b) will reach the most egregious cases where the fraud was 
actually perpetrated inside the United States. 195 This result can hardly be said to offend 
international comity when the crimes were committed within a U.S. jurisdiction and the victims 
were U.S. citizens. Moreover, it does not disturb precedent holding that mere residency or trade 
execution is insufficient to establish applicability of I O(b ). 
By .preserving the Morrison approach and expressly adopting the irrevocable liability 
standard, all types of sponsored ADRs should fall within the purview of I O(b ). Level II and 
Level III ADRs easily satisfY the first prong of the Morrison test since they are listed on a U.S. 
exchange. 196 The analysis is slightly more complicated, however, for Level I ADRs and those 
ADRs distributed through a 144A offering. In a 144A offering, the issuer tenders the ADRs in 
exchange for new capital. 197 As in Liberty Media, since this transaction constitutes a binding 
contract (capital exchanged for shares), the investor incurred irrevocable liability. 198 For Level I 
ADRs, one could argue that the act of registering the securities is a clear indication that the issuer 
intends to execute a sale in the United States. As a result, Congress should treat Level I ADRs in 
a similar manner to merger agreements. Although some variables may remain undetermined, 
such as who the ultimate purchaser of the security will be, by registering the securities the issuer 
195 See e.g., Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177-178 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
196 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (2010) (Under the frrst prong of the transactional test, Section lO(b) only applies to 
"securities listed on domestic exchanges"). 
197 Saunders, supra note 87, at 70-74. 
198 Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 2d 262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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has affirmatively indicated that it intends to be bound by the transaction. In addition, by 
transferring title to a U.S. custodian, the issuer should meet the standard of "irrevocable 
liability."199 
The only gray area remammg within this modified Morrison framework pertains to 
unsponsored ADRs. For an unsponsored ADR facility, ADRs may be issued without the express 
cooperation of the issuer.200 Here, the dividing line may need to be whether the issuer reaches 
out to establish an exemption under Section 12g3-2(b) of the Exchange Act. If the issuer is an 
active participant (by soliciting an exemption), one could argue that the company has incurred 
irrevocable liability in the United States. If the issuer's cooperation is unnecessary, then there is 
nothing to tie the company to the transaction. Therefore, although the approach advocated herein 
should create a bright line for sponsored ADRs, unsponsored ADRs will most likely remain 
beyond 1 O(b )' s reach. 
ADRs will not be the only market plagued with uncertainty until Congress finally rules 
on how IO(b) should be applied for private causes of action. Unanswered questions remain 
concerning other types of complex financial instruments, such as CFDs and swaps.201 For 
example, SEC v. Campania Internacional Financiera S.A. concerned the potential application of 
199 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fuod Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 
F.2d 426, 426 (2d Cir. 1954). 
200 Saunders, supra note 87, at 54-55. 
201 Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., No. CIV A 07 CIV. 8538, 2008 WL 2876373 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008) 
("CFD purchasers acquire the future price movement of the uoderlying company's common stock (positive or 
negative) without taking formal ownership of the uoderlying shares. Unlike calls and puts, which trade in tandem 
with, but not at the same price as, the underlying publicly traded common stock, the purchase and sale prices of 
CFDs are alleged to be identical to the prices quoted for shares of the uoderlying company's common stock on the 
public securities exchange."). A swap is a contractual agreement evidenced by a single document in which two 
parties, called couoterparties, agree to make periodic payments to eachother. JACK MARSHALL & KEN KAPNER, 
UNDERSTANDING SWAPS 3 (1993). In the agreement, the couoterparties specify which currencies they intend to 
exchange, the applicable interest rates, the timetable for payments, and any other terms that impact the relationship 
of the parties. !d. 
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Section 10(b) to holders of United Kingdom CFDs.202 These CFDs were traded based on the 
price of Arch Chemicals listed on the NYSE in the United States.203 The court ultimately 
concluded that there was nothing in Morrison that precluded the application of lO(b ).Z04 This 
result is incredibly surprising given that the CFDs were certainly not listed on any U.S. 
exchange, and, even though the value of the instrument was tied to a U.S. security, the actual 
instrument was bought and sold in the United Kingdom.205 Arguably, the verdict would have 
been the same had the court applied the conduct and effects test, but this decision raises the 
question of whether Morrison truly does create a more predictable approach. 
By contrast, in Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobile Holding SE, the court held that 
security-based swap agreements did not fall under the protection of 1 O(b ).Z06 The court placed 
heavy emphasis on the fact that the swap agreements were linked to the share price of a foreign 
stock, similar to the argument made above.Z07 By referencing the foreign stock price, the court 
determined that the swap agreements were the "functional equivalent of trading the underlying 
VW shares on a German exchange."208 Again, the decision produces a puzzling result: although 
the swap agreement is itself American (and therefore the transaction likely took place on U.S. 
soil), 1 O(b) offers no protection for the investor, since the reference security is foreign. The 
foreign issuer is likely the big winner in these cases because, in the first instance, at least it could 
predict potential litigation in the United States by listing stock there. Yet the U.S. investors who 
conduct trades entirely in the United States by virtue of an instrument that was created entirely in 
the United States are left unprotected. These examples illustrate that while Morrison creates a 
202 SEC v. Compania lnternacional Financiera S.A. No. II CIV 4904{DLC), 2011 WL 3251813 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 
2011). 
203 ld at *I. 
204 Id at *6. 
205 Id at *8. 
206 Elliot Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
207 Id at 469. 
208 Id at 476. 
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bright-line approach in theory, in practice results vary dramatically. Irrevocable liability, by 
contrast, may better serve the twin goals of predictability and comity. 
Part VI. Conclusion 
While the Morrison decision abandoned the conduct and effects test for private antifraud 
actions,209 the Dodd-Frank Act-without expressly stating as much-effectively put an end to 
Morrison's transactional approach for actions brought by the SEC and the DOJ.210 According to 
the Morrison court, one of the major flaws of the Second Circuit's approach was that it led to 
unpredictable and inconsistent application;211 therefore, a bright-line transactional approach 
would simplify the extraterritoriality analysis.212 Unfortunately, the Morrison decision and the 
Dodd-Frank Act left open many questions, including what the appropriate standard should be for 
private causes of action and how the courts should interpret the second prong of the Morrison 
test, particularly when examining complex financial products, like ADRs. 
Since Morrison was decided, the courts' treatment of ADRs has been somewhat 
inconsistent.213 Most courts have found that Level II and III ADRs fall under the first prong, 
while Level I and 144A ADRs fall under the second prong. 214 The courts have been forced to 
perform fact-intensive inquiries to examine the type of ADR, the nature and location of the 
transaction and what prompted the purchase or sale of the security. This expensive and time-
consuming analysis is contrary to both the goals and the spirit of Morrison. 
209 Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010). 
210 Dodd-Frank Act§ 929P(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
211 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2873 (2010). 
212 ld at 2881 ("we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can 
legislate with predictable effects"). 
213 Compare Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and Stackhouse v. Toyota 
Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 (DSF) (AJWX), 2010 WL 3377409, at *I (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010), with In re Societe 
Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010), and Copeland v. 
Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
214 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2874 (2010) (the second prong of the test covers "domestic transactions in other 
securities"). 
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Under the irrevocable liability approach, Level II and III ADRs would still satisfy the 
first prong of Morrison, leaving precedent undisturbed. For Level I ADRs, by abiding by the 
reporting requirements of the SEC, thereby affecting an executory transaction, the issuer would 
be said to incur irrevocable liability at the time it authorized the shares for issue, rather than the 
point at which the shares are actually purchased by investors. The same analysis could easily 
apply to ADRs issued through a 144A offering, where irrevocable liability arises when the issuer 
reaches in to the United States to generate capital from qualified investors. Absent an 
exemption-which arguably reflects an issuer's reaching in to the United States-unsponsored 
ADRs are likely to be the only category of ADR's that fall outside lO(b)'s protection, a result 
that is consistent with legal and scholarly precedent. 
Although it remains to be seen which approach Congress will adopt, 929Y offered 
several compelling solutions, which could reconcile the goals of Congress, the Supreme Court, 
issuers, and institutional investors. But just as the Second Circuit guided early 1 O(b) 
jurisprudence by inventing the conduct and effects test that governed securities regulation for 
four decades, the Second Circuit with the assistance of the Southern District of New York has 
taken the helm in developing and re-defining the irrevocable liability standard. 215 Perhaps, 
history will repeat itself, and the Second Circuit will once again re-emerge as the "north star" for 
lO(b) analysis.216 In any event, Congress should consider adopting the irrevocable liability 
approach for private causes of action, since it best advances the objectives of predictability and 
international comity, while protecting the stability and integrity of the U.S. financial markets. 
215 Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426,426 (2d Cir. 1954); Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., No. 03 CIV. 
2175(SAS), 2012 WL 1203825, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 
147, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) motion to certifY appeal denied, No. 10 CIV. 3229 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 17, 2011); Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 166 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
216 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2889. 
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